Ukraine: the crucial year?
Ukraine: the crucial year?
Russia's big advance has come to nothing in the trenches of Bakhmut. Much now hangs on Ukraine's counteroffensive. It could even be its last chance to retake its country
Two short months after a major debate across NATO over whether Ukraine should receive German-made Leopard tanks, Ukrainian soldiers are rapidly completing training to operate these advanced armoured vehicles. Similar training is underway for the UK Challenger 2 and America’s Abrams tanks. Whilst the American tanks are not due to arrive in Ukraine until the Autumn, the Leopards and Challengers are entering service in the coming days and weeks.
As these crucial weapons are rolled out to the Ukrainian military, fighter jets will also soon start to arrive in Ukraine. As with the tanks, it was originally seen as impossible that Ukraine would receive combat planes from NATO members. Indeed, in March 2022, the US specifically blocked a Polish proposal for their MIG-29s, a plane on which many Ukrainian pilots had been trained, to be shipped to Ukraine via a US airbase in Germany. The Pentagon judged that the plan risked escalation with Russia. Contrast that with the news of mid-March that both Poland and Slovakia would send MIG-29s, as well as similar ideas being actively considered by the Netherlands, among others. The definition of “advisable” levels of support to Ukraine has evolved dramatically over the past year.
All of this is in preparation for Ukraine’s counteroffensive. With the advantage of fast-moving tanks, the Ukrainians may try to break through Russian lines in the Donbas, cutting Russian-held territory in the East of Ukraine from its strip on the Sea of Azov coastline, where it joins to Crimea. This area of territory, around fifty miles deep, includes the port cities of Berdiansk and Mariupol. The liberation of the city of Mariupol, largely destroyed after the Russian siege at the start of the war, would represent a major Ukrainian victory. The city is hugely significant to both sides - to the Ukrainians as the site of extensive Russian war crimes including the notorious bombings of a maternity hospital and of a theatre packed with refugees. To the Russians, it is one of their few significant gains from their war, with the siege of the Azovstal steel plant providing a false but convenient narrative of Russia heroically overcoming Ukrainian fascism.
In this light, Putin’s decision to visit Mariupol (or, given claims that a body double was used, the decision to stage a visit there) shows the emphasis the Russians are placing on this city as part of their new territories. During the era of the Russian Empire, which Putin likes to valorise, this area was part of a territory known as Novorossiya - New Russia. Its name and its history are a core part of Russia’s imperial period, and at various times since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, the name has been revived by Donbas separatists.
They threw everything at taking the town of Bakhmut, a strategically irrelevant settlement whose pre-war population was equal to that of Bognor Regis.
Putin may have been trying to distract from the failure of Russia’s big offensive. They threw everything at taking the town of Bakhmut, a strategically irrelevant settlement whose pre-war population was equal to that of Bognor Regis. The effort lasted nearly 10 months and cost them up to 30,000 casualties, according to western officials. As the UK’s Defence Intelligence Service (DIS) reported on 25 March, Russia’s assault on Bakhmut - the centrepiece of their military effort - “has largely stalled”. Reporting “extreme attrition” on the Russian side (as well as heavy Ukrainian losses), the DIS points to disputes between Russian regular military and the Wagner mercenary force as a factor in the failure. This has been an issue throughout the past 10 months, with Wagner, a private company owned by Putin’s associate Evgeny Prigozhin, consuming much of Russia’s military logistics, generating considerable tensions with the regular military, according to widespread reporting as well as various briefings I’ve received from Western officials.
These officials also pointed to a wider issue that Russia faced in its so-called ‘major offensive’: it lacks the logistic capability to mount a wide advance. The focus on Bakhmut was largely because it doesn’t have the resources to do anything bigger or strategically significant elsewhere. After the failure in Bakhmut, Russia is turning its attention to Adviika, a town less than half the size of Bakhmut, little more than a large village. On such ‘victories’ hang Russia’s war. In this light, Putin’s announcement of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus is another attempt to divert attention from Bakhmut and disincentivise international military support to the Ukrainians.
Russia’s current failures do not simply mean Ukraine’s victory is guaranteed.
But Russia’s current failures do not simply mean Ukraine’s victory is guaranteed. There are concerns around the speed of delivery of western tanks, and also their state of repair. Ukraine has suffered significant losses defending Bakhmut, including experienced soldiers that it needs to retake territory elsewhere. And Russia will find it easier to defend territory than to take it from the Ukrainians. The evidence suggests that they are very well dug into many of the lands they occupy in the Donbas.
The biggest risk for Ukraine may be elsewhere - across the Atlantic. In particular, America’s Republicans. Whether you believe that Donald Trump is compromised by Russia or just strangely attracted to Putin and his authoritarian tendencies, his views on US support to Ukraine could not be clearer. Trump has said that he would end the war in Ukraine “in one day”. He would do this by allowing Putin to take over “certain areas that are Russian-speaking areas”. Trump remains the favourite to secure the GOP nomination for the presidency, in spite of all his legal woes. Were he to be beaten by Ron DeSantis, things don’t look much better for Ukraine. As DeSantis wrote in a statement for Fox News, he took the view that “becoming further entangled in a territorial dispute between Ukraine and Russia” was not in the United States’s interests. He has since tried to clarify these comments, but it is clear that he has little enthusiasm for the US support to Ukraine. This is because the pro-Trump voters that DeSantis courts have bought into their leader’s pro-Russian leanings.
This view is matched by the hardline Republicans in congress, notably Marjorie Taylor Greene, who said, to cheers at a Trump rally, “under Republicans, not another penny will go to Ukraine.” Whilst Greene can be dismissed as a marginal figure, not taken seriously by her peers, she and a small band of fellow hardliners control the balance of power in the House of Representatives, giving them outsize influence. Even if President Biden or another Democrat wins the 2024 election, they will spend much of next year focusing on the campaign and will probably be more cautious than hitherto over their support to Ukraine.
The idea that China is about to serve up a pro-Russian peace deal does not appear likely from their public statements.
Whilst this is happening, Xi Jinping visited Russia last week and spoke about a supposed peace plan. Whilst the nature of the visit was very much to stress the Beijing - Moscow alliance, what little specifics that emerged of China’s ‘peace proposals’ don’t appear very helpful to Putin. There is much emphasis on the importance of respecting territorial integrity, which feels like a dig at Russia. So it is hard to imagine a peace agreement emerging from this basis. The idea that China is about to serve up a pro-Russian peace deal does not appear likely from their public statements. And the Chinese have yet to speak to the Ukrainians about it anyway.
So, with no serious peace plan in the offing and with US support to Ukraine uncertain in the medium term, 2023 may be Ukraine’s crucial year. Putin needs the war to go on as long as possible. The Ukrainians may need to end it, or get close to ending it, this year.
I ALWAYS enjoy reading anything you write, Arthur, but your comments here do too easily mirror the US-HMG narrative. It is a very 'optimistic' piece.
The reason nothing is happening right now, apart from the continuation of what is largely an artillery war, is because both sides are literally stuck in mud!
Agree with Mathew, way too optimistic as you have been since the war started. No recognition of how critical the war is in R eyes, not just Putin. US prevents all attempts at negotiations even when UKR expresses need. Zelensky is trying now to get a meeting with Xi and make some progress diplomatically. Forget US politics, what about war fatigue in the EU? AFU are tired and need a break as much as R. UKR economy is devasted.