What do the Houthis want?

Perhaps they're making this up as they go along

I first learned about the Huthi rebels about 20 years ago when, as a diplomat in Yemen, I accompanied the British Ambassador to the Presidential Palace. There, the wily President Ali Abdallah Salih, who would later be killed by Huthis in 2017 after his alliance with them fell apart, told us about a new Shi’a militia movement, led by the Huthi family, operating in the rugged mountains north of Sa’ada, backed by Iran and Lebanese Hizbullah and surprisingly hard to defeat. Some of it was definitely true (hard to defeat), other bits were in the process of coming true (at that stage, the Huthis had yet to get fulsome support from Iran and Hizbullah, but they certainly have it now). As many will now be well aware, this movement has been fighting for the control of North Yemen for twenty years, and in the process has drifted closer to Iran and the wider Shi’a Muslim community.

As I have written elsewhere, you would do well not to underestimate the Huthis. President Salih, once seen as the ultimate survivor in Yemeni politics, did not survive his attempts to manage them. The Saudis, with one of the best-equipped militaries in the world tried to destroy the Huthis, only to face a quagmire and sue for peace. Time and again, the Huthis’ utter ruthlessness, indifference to civilian suffering and mastery of an incredibly hostile environment has made them the last men standing.

But what do they want? To understand the Huthis is a bit like looking at a pop group that has toiled away for years playing local and regional gigs, enjoying some success and gaining supporters but never hitting the big time. And then suddenly their work hits the zeitgeist, goes viral and everyone is talking about them. The success has happened sufficiently quickly that they might not have a very clear plan or strategy over what to do next.

Up until this year, I don’t think the Huthis were very focused on what people outside the Arabian peninsular thought of them. There are exceptions to this statement: the Huthis are closely allied with Iran and Hizbullah, but the broad mass of Sunni Arabs in places like the Gulf and Egypt were of lesser importance to the Huthi leadership, and vice versa. They had their famous slogan “God Is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam” but it didn’t have any significant impact on their day-to-day behaviours or tactics. Their movement was rooted in the specific dynamics of North Yemen and the relatively obscure religious tenets of Zaydism (among other things, much emphasis is placed on families that claim a direct line of descent from the Prophet Muhammad, such as the Huthi family).

But their response to the October 7 massacre and their access to increasingly sophisticated Iranian missiles and drones have changed these dynamics. The Huthis’ decision to attack international shipping, claiming to be acting in the Palestinians’ interests, even as much of their targets are in fact nothing to do with either Israel or Palestine, has proved a massive hit with the Arab Street. At a time when no Arab government has been seen to have responded to Israel’s destructive operations in Gaza, and when even Hizbullah appears to be pulling its punches, the Huthis have stepped up as the most determined and active member of Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’.

From a Western perspective we are very focused on the risks of ‘escalation’ and ‘regional war’. But as the extraordinary levels of destruction and civilian loss of life in Gaza are reported nightly on news channels across the Middle East, the question being asked is “who’s standing up for the Palestinians?” And the Huthis, with their attacks on global shipping and their increasingly slick propaganda videos could claim to be the answer to that question. Even the Saudis, who have faced continued missile and drone attacks from the Huthis, were expressing “great concern” after the US decision to mount airstrikes against Huthi targets. This is partly because of the delicate peace negotiations ongoing between Saudi Arabia and various Yemeni factions, including the Huthis. But it is also because MbS knows that many ordinary Saudis look at the destruction in Gaza and ask what has their government done to support their Arab brethren.

Is this an Iranian plan?

One question is whether the Huthis are acting because they have decided to embroil themselves in the conflict or because they have been told to do so by their friends in Tehran. I use the words “friends” advisedly, because the Huthis are not directly controlled by Tehran in the way that Lebanese Hizbullah clearly is, even though they benefit from Iranian weapons and logistics. However, it is clearly beneficial to Iran to be able to have the Huthis reminding everyone of Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’, particularly because Lebanese Hizbullah has been fairly muted in its response to Israel. Iran sees Hizbullah as probably its most prized asset outside the country, to be used in the event that the Iranian regime itself feels threatened. Its attitude to the Huthis is something that is rather more expendable.

But the Huthis themselves seemed to have willed the US and UK airstrikes: they continued to escalate attacks even after a major naval taskforce had been assembled in the Red Sea. They cannot have expected any other outcome. Recall that this is a revolutionary, millenarian movement that has been in a constant state of warfare for twenty years. The Huthis have weathered severe attacks by the Saudi-led coalition and are probably unlikely to be easily deterred by limited airstrikes. They may also know that the US and UK have very little desire get embroiled in a major conflict: there is no existential threat to Huthi power. So perhaps we can expect continued attacks on shipping, and continued, limited, airstrikes in response. At the moment, above all the Huthis want to be noticed, and it’s working: everybody is talking about them.