There are lots of great articles being published looking back over the past two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. I see no need to add to those, preferring to look forward. And the look forward is not encouraging. The war in Ukraine has become a war of attrition. In a war of attrition the key determinants of success are manpower, equipment and morale. Of these three elements, manpower is by far the most important. During the First Wold War, the Allies had an almost two-to-one advantage over the Central Powers. In the current war, Russia has a population of around 150 million, compared to Ukraine’s of 37 million.
This isn’t quite as miserable as it sounds from the bare numbers: there are plenty of limitations on Russia’s ability to recruit soldiers because President Putin has yet to call for a general mobilisation. This partly explains Russia’s reliance on mercenaries and freed prisoners. It is also the case that the Russian approach to warfare is to be almost completely indifferent to casualties, so it needs many more troops than Ukraine would to achieve the same objectives. In its most recent offensive in Avdiivka, the town that fell to Russian troops in the Donbas on 17 February, the Russians were suffering casualties of a thousand troops per day, the highest level since the start of the conflict, according to a briefing I attended from western officials. All this for a town of limited strategic significance. So Russia’s numerical advantage might not be as useful to them as is typically the case. But this does not make it irrelevant.
And Russia may have the choice to expand its manpower significantly in the coming weeks. There are reports that President Putin plans to call a general mobilisation once the election is out of the way (it will conclude on 17 March). I’m not convinced by these reports: since the outcome of the election is not in any doubt, it’s hard to imagine there’s much holding him back at the moment. But perhaps getting the election out of the way is more to him important than we imagine.
Russia’s manpower advantage is not in doubt. Ukraine’s only mitigation was being better trained and, most importantly, better armed. Commanders were very clear that Ukraine had to abandon Avdiivka because it ran out of ammunition. In that battle, Russia was firing five times as many shells as Ukraine was. At present, there isn’t going to be more support coming from the Americans (aside from the final deliveries of previously committed aid). Thanks to the baleful influence of Donald Trump on the US Republican Party, there is not currently a majority in the US House of Representatives that will vote to arm Ukraine. There are all kinds of procedural gambits being explored by Democrats in Congress, but for the moment none of these looks likely to prevail. Ukraine will have to survive without US supplies for the foreseeable future.
Europe’s hour…?
That leaves it reliant on Europe, which has certainly stepped up in a bigger way than many expected. At the start of the war, Germany, which had a history of close business relations with Russia, invited ridicule by sending helmets to the Ukrainian army. But Germany has transformed its approach, sending significant quantities so that it is now getting close to having sent half of the value of the military support that the US has sent (from a country whose economy and military budget is significantly less than half the size of the USA’s). Other countries have further to go: the UK’s military support risks being overtaken by Denmark, a country that is far smaller both in GDP and military funding terms.
Perhaps the least impressive example is France. It has done some important things, notably providing SCALP cruise missiles which are right at the cutting edge of the offensive technology available to Ukraine (and it’s notable that Germany will not provide a similar weapons system, known as Taurus). France claims that its support has been miscounted, but even if you take France’s own estimates of its support as being around $3 billion, that still puts it far behind Germany and the UK. France is the EU’s second largest economy and its largest military power.
Europe needs a war economy
One of the factors weighing on the French approach is the belief that Europe needs to transform its overall defence industrial productivity as a prelude to ramping up support to Ukraine. The EU’s commitment to have sent a million artillery shells to Ukraine by March 2024 has no chance of being reached, exposing a severe lack of industrial capacity. It is now being promised that the target will be met by the Autumn, although this remains questionable. It’s clear that the vast economic bloc of the EU, the world’s largest economic zone, is unable currently to manufacture sufficient weapons to enable Ukraine to fight a war with Russia. This is rather ridiculous, given Russia’s own sclerotic economy and the fact that it is getting huge numbers of shells from North Korea, one of the poorest countries on earth (albeit one that uses slave labour).
The prospects for Ukraine and the rest of Europe are all the more bleak when you consider the prospect of a Trump presidency. It might not be guaranteed that Trump will let Russia win the war in Ukraine, but all the indications point to this. The debate over whether Trump acts ‘for’ Russia or just sees his and Russia’s interests as being aligned might be for another time. The effect is the same. But Trump has also shown extreme hostility to NATO. Although he doesn’t appear to understand how NATO works (he talks of it as a joint account into which European countries are not making their required commitments) he is very clear that he doesn’t feel America has any obligations to its allies.
NATO is a defensive alliance, not a joint account. But that makes it even worse: Trump has made it clear that he doesn’t see why the United States should have to go to war in the event that one of the Baltic States were to be attacked by Russia. Since all of the Baltic States already spend well over the current NATO target it’s clear that this isn’t only about money. Trump doesn’t see why it is in his (or America’s, but he tends to be bad at separating the personal and national) interests to commit to fight for another country. I doubt that expanded NATO expenditure will make much difference to his view that he doesn’t want to get dragged into ‘other people’s wars’. So Europe (including the UK) needs to transform its defence industrial capacity if it is to help Ukraine and if it is to survive a second Trump presidency.
Other things being equal, Russia will win a war of attrition with Ukraine. Russia may not have the resources to mount a decisive offensive, but it is well able to grind Ukraine into submission. This should probably feel like an emergency, but Europe (including Britain) talks instead of ‘a year of consolidation’ in Ukraine’s war of national survival, which sounds like a contradiction. If Ukraine defeats Russia, the considerable risks for Europe associated with a second Trump presidency are much reduced. The nightmare scenario is that Russia defeats Ukraine and Trump becomes president. Is that where we are headed?
An interesting narrative.
Just considering the writer's conclusion it seems that "nightmare scenario" is well on the way to reality. Ukraine has all but lost, and free of external pressures should cut its losses now, and for a variety of reasons it looks as if Trump will return to the Oval Office.
I am confident NATO will survive.
That is really interesting, and depressing! You say "the debate over whether Trump acts ‘for’ Russia or just sees his and Russia’s interests as being aligned might be for another time." That's a question I'd love to hear you explore more deeply, perhaps in one of your prodacasts?