Saudi nationalism and the end of Pax Americana

After turbulent years of aligning along sectarian divisions, the Middle East is getting back to its comfort zone: authoritarian nationalism. But this time, the US isn't in the centre picture

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Americans’ Middle Eastern allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, intervened to stabilise global oil prices. For decades, as the global ‘swing producer’ of oil, Saudi Arabia has been able to adjust its production levels to change, and stabilise the price. And it has done so repeatedly, often in order to help its ally America.

The Saudis helped America for two reasons - partly because much of its surplus from oil sales was invested in the West, especially the United States, giving it an interest in economic stability there. But the main reason was that the Saudis’ security was guaranteed by America. This was illustrated most clearly with the deployment of US forces to Saudi Arabia in 1990 to defend it against Iraq. More than half a million US military were sent to the deserts of Saudi Arabia, which is a reminder of the power of the sole global superpower at the end of the Cold War.

Like many a faltering relationship, the slow, conscious uncoupling of the US - Saudi bond has unfolded over many years. A major setback was the 9/11 attacks, perpetrated by 19 hijackers, 15 of which were Saudis, and spearheaded by another Saudi, Usama bin Ladin. Since that time it has emerged that Saudi diplomats assisted some of the key hijackers whilst they were in California preparing the attacks (although it isn’t clear whether these diplomats knew about the attackers’ intentions and no evidence has emerged that the Saudi government itself was involved in attack planning).

A young man in a hurry

The major change has been the arrival on the scene of Muhammad bin Salman (MBS) as Crown Prince since 2017 and effective ruler of the country. MBS, unlike many of his older siblings and cousins, was not educated outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Instead, he was under the influence of Professor Hamad bin Muhammad Al-AlSheikh at King Saud University. This is one of the factors that gives MBS a very different perspective on where the Kingdom’s interests lie (another being his age - he is in his thirties and the Gulf War must seem to him a distant episode of history). Al-AlSheikh taught MBS that Saudi Arabia needed to stop being the world’s gas station, and start acting in its own direct national interests. For decades, Saudi Arabia was run as the private property of the Al-Saud family: it didn’t have national policies so much as family interests. The Al-Sauds maintained their oil markets and their security relationships. And they continued a centuries-old alliance with ultra-orthodox Sunni Islam which they enforced domestically and promoted globally. By channelling billions of petrodollars into the promotion of Wahhabism worldwide, the Al-Saud sought to reduce attention on their own distinctly unIslamic lifestyles.

Under MBS Saudi Arabia has become less conservative and appears not to be spending much money on promoting fundamentalist Islam. At the same time it has developed a nationalist policy, rather than pursue the family interests pursued by MBS’s various uncles who had wielded power before him. This should not be mistaken for any kind of democracy: MBS is pursuing authoritarian nationalism where all power is concentrated in his hands. It’s just that it is no longer hand-in-hand with Taliban-style restrictions on women.

A family business

In the family-property era of the Saudi Kingdom, its foreign policy, where that did not contradict its wider trading relationships, could be predicted along an ideological trajectory. The Saudi monarchy always felt threatened by Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which, as a purportedly democratic movement, was inherently opposed to the debauched privilege enjoyed by the Saudi royal family. Therefore, in Libya, Turkey, Sudan and Egypt, just for example, the Saudis would support whoever was in opposition to the Islamist faction. In other contexts the Saudis would focus their activities against Iran or its allies. This was because the Saudis, as the self-appointed leaders of global Sunni Islam, felt threatened by Shi’a Islam and invested resources into exploiting Sunni-Shi’a rivalry. The Shi’a living on Saudi territory were (and still are) often persecuted, suspected of being an Iranian fifth column ready to undermine the country. And Iran itself, as a revolutionary Islamic Republic, was inherently opposed to Saudi Arabia, a conservative monarchy.

MBS’s foreign policy clown car

In MBS’s early years, as he stumbled through a series of foreign policy disasters, the lodestar of “oppose the Brotherhood, oppose Iran” was the only logic behind a series of chaotic interventions and escapades: the stalemated war in Yemen, the humiliating failed blockade of Qatar (which has a long history of closeness to the Muslim Brotherhood), the kidnapping of the Lebanese prime minister (he was seen as too close to Lebanon’s Iranian proxy, Hizbullah) and the murder of Jamal Khashoggi (accused by MBS of being sympathetic to Islamists).

Yemen

Contrary to the widespread portrayal as a ruthless genius, MBS proved himself to be impulsively clumsy in foreign policy. But he had the unusual good fortune to be working with a US government controlled by the Trump family during this period. The Trump approach to foreign policy was largely similar to the Saudi one: a senior prince (Jared Kushner) was put in charge of foreign relations and left to pursue a combination of his family’s personal commercial interests and his personal agenda for the region. The formal institutions of US foreign policy, such as the State Department and National Security Council were largely bypassed or ignored. The Saudis found this system of government easy to work with, for obvious reasons.

When the US took a “return to normalcy” under President Biden, MBS found himself out of favour. Biden had made it clear that he viewed him as responsible for Khashoggi’s killing (which is fair enough, since MBS had ordered it). As much as the US continued some of its traditional engagement with the Kingdom, Biden had to steer a more distant path in view of the international outrage caused by Khashoggi’s murder.

Ukraine - the moment of truth

Nonetheless, in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as oil prices spiked, the United States had a reasonable expectation that the Saudis would do their usual thing and pump more oil. But President Biden visited Saudi Arabia and came home empty-handed. He was following Boris Johnson, who had been given the same, humiliating treatment. At a stroke, the central pillar of western policy towards Saudi Arabia appeared to have collapsed. “We guarantee your security and, as long as you keep oil prices stable, we won’t hassle you about what’s happening in your country,” was the deal struck between Franklin Delano Roosevelt and MBS’s grandfather, King Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Saud, in 1945.

By 2022, Saudi Arabia was practising a new form of foreign policy, authoritarian Saudi nationalism. The Middle Eastern version of Pax Americana was over. And this was because the Americans were seen as no longer reliable.

By 2022, this deal had ended. Saudi Arabia was practising a new form of foreign policy, one of authoritarian Saudi nationalism. The Middle Eastern version of Pax Americana was over. And this was because the Americans were seen as no longer reliable. When Iranian-backed Houthi rebels from Yemen claimed credit for a major strike against Saudi oil installations, the Americans did nothing. Trump hated foreign wars, but even Biden preferred to avoid them. In 2023 there could be no question of half a million US troops being deployed to the region.

Arab Nationalism, first time around

From the 1950s to the 1980s a series of strongman Arab dictators had ruled their countries with an ideology of nationalism. By definition, nationalism is particular to the country it arises in, but the Arab nationalism of the twentieth century had certain common themes: militaristic, autocratic Arab rulers, notably but not exclusively in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, ran secular administrations, opposed to imperialism and to the Gulf monarchies. Most of these regimes ended in failure, often sparking a counteracting wave of Islamist revival. But elements of the Arab nationalist movement proved remarkably resilient, such as the Ba’ath Party which controlled Iraq until the US-led invasion and still, in the person of the Assad regime, controls Syria.

Baghdad - first-wave Arab nationalism

The new Arab nationalism?

In the past 12 months, as MBS seeks to extricate himself from his ill-fated foreign policy messes, particularly the failed war in Yemen, he has also needed to reset his relationships with other regional powers. The autocratic secularist Bashar Al-Assad of Syria. The autocratic Islamist Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey. The autocratic Shi’a revolutionaries of Iran. With all of these, MBS is able to identify a post-ideological, autocratic common ground.

Since ultra-orthodox Sunni Wahhabism is no longer the guiding light of Saudi’s domestic policies, MBS no longer feels the need to have these values guide his behaviour overseas. Shorn of the need to oppose the secular nationalist and Iranian ally Bashar Al-Assad, MBS, who isn’t offended by the autocratic brutality of the Syrian regime, can look forward to investment opportunities for Saudi firms as they participate in the reconstruction of the country.

The Saudi rapprochement with Syria has to be seen in a context of a regional tendency to authoritarian stability. Dictators across the region find it easy to deal with one another. Turkey has mostly stopped supporting Syrian rebels, and has also improved its relations with the Saudis, in spite of Erdogan’s Muslim Brotherhood leanings. The United Arab Emirates, with a similar foreign policy outlook to MBS, has cosied up to Syria and Iran. And the Saudis and Emiratis worked together with Egypt to quash the democracy movement in Sudan, replacing it with a military authoritarian government. Finally and most significantly, Saudi Arabia and Iran have also reached an agreement to reestablish their diplomatic relations, albeit in a limited and uneasy fashion, brokered by China. MBS used to hope for an Iran that would be contained by Western policies. But that no longer looks plausible, particularly after Donald Trump tore up the Iran nuclear deal (the JCPOA). Instead, MBS realises it is easier to do a deal, extricate himself from the mess in Yemen, and focus on his internal economic agenda, the Saudi vision 2030.

Whilst the US is reportedly comfortable with the deal in place, it is interesting that it was another authoritarian nationalist state, China, that acted as mediator. The interests of each of these countries’ rulers trumps their ideological differences (Sunni, Shi’a, Chinese Communist). Dictators can disagree over ideologies whilst finding each other easy to work with. On the other hand, MBS, who has never lived in a democracy (unlike many other Saudi princes) sees free countries as sources of problems: accusations against him, investigations of his conduct, lectures on how Saudi should behave.

It’s all about oil

But it is oil prices, above all, that illustrate this new Arab nationalism. On April 3, the Saudis, with their key oil producing allies the UAE, Iraq, Algeria and Oman made a surprise announcement of reduced oil production, pushing prices up immediately. Also involved in the plan was Russia and Kazakhstan, which will be major beneficiaries, the higher prices helping Putin pay for his war against Ukraine. Once again, America’s ability to rely on the Saudis to help them at moments of need was shown to be illusory.

Strategic genius?

MBS’s record in foreign policy is, putting it generously, mixed. The early years of his control of Saudi Arabia was characterised with an emphasis on confronting Iran. Most of these confrontations failed, even as Iran’s own economy collapsed. Now, Saudi Arabia will try to avoid conflict with Iran whilst also limiting the degree of US influence in the region. In this sense they are working with the direction of travel in Washington DC: there is little appetite in North America for a high-commitment relationship with the Gulf region. But the Americans would still like Saudi oil to become available when price stability demands it. And it is still possible that the Saudis will need American security guarantees in the future. Rather as the Arab nationalists of the twentieth century faced military humiliation against a young Israeli state, the Saudis have been humiliated by the Yemeni Houthi rebels. But if MBS thinks he doesn’t need to help the Americans with their oil prices, does he now expect China, Russia and Turkey to help him keep his kingdom secure? The Axis of Autocracy might not prove such a reliable alliance.