Operation Spider's Web: opening Pandora's Box
Only Ukraine could have come up with something so brilliant. But other countries might try it
Operation Spider’s Web, in which Ukraine disabled and destroyed around 40 of Russia’s most prized military planes, some of them located more than 4,000 kilometres from Kyiv, will be talked of as one of the boldest, most innovative special operations in history. It has been described in detail elsewhere, but the most creative thing about its success was getting relatively short-range FPV drones close to their targets by hiding them in the roof of shipping containers. Unwitting Russian lorry drivers trucked them across the country, being instructed to park near to key airfields and were then amazed to see swarms of drones emerge from the roof of the containers, from where they flew at planes parked on the ground.
The targets of these strikes were strategic bombers, a kind of plane that very few countries operate, and which enables Russia to make strikes against Ukraine (and, by extension, other targets in Europe if it chooses to do so) over great distances and potentially including nuclear weapons. Britain, by contrast, can only launch nuclear weapons from its submarines (although the latest defence review points to our developing an air-launch capability in the future. I discussed this in the most recent episode of my podcast with the MP and defence expert, Mike Martin).
Whilst Russia’s strategic bomber fleet hasn’t been completely disabled by these strikes, it is severely damaged and several of the older planes hit, including the Tu-95, are no longer being manufactured (the same goes for America’s equivalent, the B-52). This represents the biggest military setback Russia has faced since it began its invasion of Ukraine in 2014. It may have come close to a million casualties, but the tragic fact is that Moscow can continue to find people to cajole, bribe and in some cases force to fight. By contrast, it has no way of replacing most of the planes that it lost.
I recall being told, in the early days of this war, that Ukraine's creativity and ingenuity could not be overestimated. This is a brilliant example of that. But it is also an example of how warfare very quickly makes new technologies and concepts available to all sides. At the start of the 2022 war, drones were being used mostly by Ukraine. Russia quickly learned and emulated and the frontlines of this war are now a swarm of small, ‘FPV’ (first-person view) drones being launched from both sides. The technology involved in Spider’s Web is fairly simple: FPV drones carrying small amounts of explosives, each with its own remote human pilot; truck containers with a false roof compartment that could be opened at the required moment. Although the operation was brilliantly creative and involved phenomenal planning and preparation (apparently over an 18-month period), the actual technology is accessible by most countries in the world, or even by non-state actors.
Operation Spider’s Web is a reminder of how far drone technology has revolutionised warfare. The strikes were made much more challenging by Russia’s unique size. In smaller countries, and ones that are not authoritarian states, how hard would it be to drive a truck near to an important airfield? In the UK, for example, it would be easy to get to RAF Brize Norton and Lakenheath (from where US Air Force planes operate). Could India target airfields in Pakistan using this method, or China disable Taiwan’s airforce before a single soldier had set foot on the island?
On their own, operations like Spider’s Web will not lead to the defeat of Russia . But they do have a democratising effect: Russia’s unusual status as a country able to deploy strategic nuclear bombers is now less of an advantage than it was three weeks ago. But that means our own advanced capabilities are at similar risk. There will be little point having air launched nuclear weapons if the planes that deliver them can be taken out by a cheap little drone.
