My enemy's enemy's enemy's enemy
The Huthi attacks on global shipping have added even more complexity to a very confusing situation. The only conclusion: never write off the Huthis
Since I tend to write about foreign affairs and since the state of the world is a bit depressing, I didn’t think that people needed another ‘here’s my predictions for 2024’ in their inboxes in the hectic run-up to Christmas. Now that the calendar has obliged with a few days off, I did think it was worth writing something about the Huthis.
Everybody knows that the Huthi rebels in Yemen are an Iranian-backed militia that has controlled much of the north of that country since seizing the capital city in September 2014. Just how much their power and military prowess is thanks to Iranian weapons and training has been hotly debated for years. When I was a diplomat in Yemen about twenty years ago the government of President Ali Abdullah Salih was insistent that Iran was backing the group (which at the time had just started its militant activities, fighting pitched battles against the Yemeni Army in the north of the country). Our response was “okay show us the evidence of Iranian involvement - then perhaps we can discuss how to help”. And they had none. Nor did our allies. If there was an Iranian presence in North Yemen at that time, it was so tiny or so well-hidden that none of the usual suspects were able to produce firm evidence for it. But at that time, these people seemed like a marginal bunch of tribesmen in North Yemen, unlikely to have a major impact beyond its borders. How wrong we were. Never write off the Huthis.
If there was an Iranian presence in North Yemen at that time, it was so tiny or so well-hidden that none of the usual suspects were able to produce firm evidence for it.
But the shibboleth of Iranian support became a self-fulfilling prophecy: as the group gained more power and influence, Tehran saw value in having a strategic ally on the southern flanks of the Arabian Peninsula, particularly as the Huthis controlled several areas bordering its long-term rival Saudi Arabia. The roots of the Huthi-Iranian alliance lie in deep Islamic history: Iran is run as a Shi’a Muslim theocracy under the so-called ‘guardianship of the jurist’ - the Ayatollahs. Historically, North Yemen was under a vaguely similar system, ruled by a line of hereditary Imams of the Zaydi sect (which is a sort of cousin of the Shi’ism found in Iran). There are plenty of theological differences which aren’t really worth getting into - in practice, up until 1962, North Yemen was ruled by a Zaydi monarch which is a sort of precursor of the Huthis of today.
At that time a Civil War broke out in North Yemen between supporters of the old monarchy (with backing from Jordan and Saudi Arabia) and republican Arab nationalists (backed by Egypt’s Nasser). This being the Cold War, the British had never seen a hopeless monarchy they didn’t want to prop up, so they also supported the Zaydi Imams. The Egyptians made a huge commitment, at one point there being 70,000 troops on the Republican side. Egypt also made extensive use of chemical weapons, some of which were dropped from planes piloted by Hosni Mubarak, a young air force officer and later President of Egypt.
The Arab Spring intervenes
Mubarak’s sclerotic reign over Egypt came to an end in 2011 with the events of the Arab Spring. At the same time in Yemen, the chaos unleashed by its own popular uprising made it easy for the Huthis to start to take advantage and expand their control. Unlike their Zaydi forbears they were firmly opposed to the government of Saudi Arabia, in part because of Saudi attempts to undermine Zaydism by sponsoring hardline Sunni mosques and madrassas. Briefly the Huthis made common cause with Yemen’s longtime president and consummate survivor, Ali Abdullah Salih. They subsequently fell out and Salih died at their hands. Never write off the Huthis.
In 2015, after numerous provocations from the Huthis (mostly in the form of Iranian-supplied missiles and drones fired onto Saudi territory) the Saudis launched their ill-fated intervention in Yemen. With extensive support from the US, UK and UAE they proved the long-held suspicion that being the largest importer of high-tech weaponry did not make the Saudis a competent military force. Whilst they committed numerous war crimes by targeting civilian infrastructure in air strikes they were unable to defeat the Huthis in battle. The Huthis also committed plenty of war crimes, but the Saudis killed many more civilians. By 2020 the Saudis were in reverse, trying to sue for peace, their war a costly failure. As part of this, they began, cautiously and reluctantly, to try to repair their relations with Iran.
October 7 and Gaza
It is this context that is the key background to understanding the current situation. In the aftermath of the 7 October massacre, there was much speculation as to the level of Iranian involvement in the outrage. In spite of numerous claims by people who have been trying to start wars with Iran for decades, it is still unclear if Iran was directly involved. What is clear is that Iran’s nascent dialogue with Saudi Arabia did not fall apart as a result of 7 October: indeed, the first direct conversation between Iran’s president and MBS occurred a few days later, followed up with a visit by the Iranian president to Saudi Arabia in November. The prospect of thousands of Muslim civilians dying in Gaza forces Iran and the Saudis closer together, even if there is little love lost between their leadership.
The best explanation for Iran’s behaviour is that it sees an advantage - through its Huthi proxies - in reminding the world that it has the power to block the Bab Al-Mandab straits
In all of this complex mess, the surge of Huthi attacks on international shipping as it passes through the Red Sea is harder to understand. The US have declared publicly that they know Iran to have been involved in the planning of these attacks (not something they have said about October 7). The best explanation for Iran’s behaviour is that it sees an advantage - through its Huthi proxies - in reminding the world that it has the power to block the Bab Al-Mandab straits, forcing up oil prices and making a mess of world shipping (recall the impact of the Ever Given container ship blocking the Suez Canal). By attacking international shipping rather than targets in Saudi Arabia, the Huthis also start to drive a wedge between the Saudis and the Americans. There is pressure on America to launch airstrikes on Huthi targets in Yemen with the Saudis now urging restraint. It is a mark of the topsy-turvy world we’re in that the Saudis, perfectly happy to carpet bomb Yemen with American and British support as recently as 2021 are now urging restraint on what would undoubtedly be carefully targeted US strikes (although civilians still often die in these operations).
I doubt President Biden wants to be dragged into yet another conflict in the Middle East. His domestic political situation is looking very difficult and there are enough problems on his plate over support for the war in Ukraine. The only thing you can conclude from this latest chapter of the global disorder is that you should never write off the Huthis.
A very interesting short read; and most timely as well.