How far is China involved in Russia's cable war?

Chinese ships are being used to attack undersea cables in the Baltic.

There’s been a fair bit of reporting of the Russian campaign of sabotage against undersea cables, particularly in northern European countries bordering Russia. In the final months of last year, cables were severed in the Baltic Sea between Sweden and Lithuania and another between Germany and Finland. And then, on Christmas Day, a power cable between Estonia and Finland was cut by a tanker from Russia’s shadow fleet, which is being used to transport Russian oil around the world to get round sanctions. In this case, the Finns were ready and boarded the ship, sailing it into Finnish waters. Russia’s intentions were to deprive Estonia of power during the most vulnerable winter months: in that respect, it is the same objective as its constant attacks on Ukrainian power stations.

But this attack, using a ship with fairly obvious connections to Russia was different in one respect. Some of the attacks on undersea infrastructure that are clearly part of Russia’s campaign of pressure NATO members in the Baltic region appear to have been carried out by Chinese ships. In October 2023 a Chinese container ship dragged its anchor, deliberately damaging a gas pipeline and some communications cables between Finland and Estonia, before heading to the Arctic Russian port of Arkhangelsk for repairs. A year later, it was another Chinese container ship that did the damage to the cables near Sweden, Finland, Lithuania and Germany. This ship, the Yi Peng 3, had not operated outside Chinese waters until March 2024, when it suddenly became a regular visitor at Russian ports. Attempts to carry out a thorough investigation by Swedish authorities were stymied by the Chinese. And in the first week of January, a Chinese ship used the same methodology damage undersea cables leading to Taiwan.

There was some speculation in reporting of the Yi Peng 3 incident that its captain had been suborned by Russian intelligence. But I wonder if this is something bigger: effectively a Russia and China joint operation to target NATO infrastructure. The idea that Russia had somehow managed to recruit individual Chinese ship captains seems rather risky and implausible. If it were a rogue Chinese ship, would Beijing have been so unhelpful when the Swedes tried to investigate? And would Russia, increasingly depending on China economically and for key supplies to its defence industry, take the risk? What seems much more likely is that the Chinese vessels are operating as part of some understanding between Beijing and Moscow. Which would also explain China adopting the methodology to target Taiwan.

China’s decision to co-operate with the Russians against NATO countries, if it is that, is interesting. Whilst there is plenty of tension between Europe and Beijing, there have also been attempts to keep the relationship on an even keel. Visits such as Rachel Reeves’ recent journey to Beijing and the joint trip there by Emmanuel Macron and Ursula von der Leyen show that Europe still hopes to have a productive relationship. If Beijing has opted to participate in Russia’s hybrid war, that seems to suggest that it doesn't have much hope for an improvement in relations with Europe.